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Abstract 
Open Security Socket Layer (SSL) is a cryptographic library that uses appropriate security systems such as 
encryption, digital signatures, digital certificates, public/private key pairs, non-repudiation and 
time-stamping to participate in the cryptography. A Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) comprises a system of 
certificates, certificate authorities, subjects, relying partners, registration authorities and key repositories 
that provide for safe and reliable communications. In this paper, open SSL has been implemented to 
provide an alternative to the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP). Open SSL is a real time protocol in 
which the parties negotiate interactively to authenticate each other and establish a session key, in contrast to 
a protocol such as email in which one party prepares a message encrypt and send, that can later be 
decrypted and authenticated by the intended recipient. 
Keywords: Open SSL, Public Key Infrastructure, Digital signatures 
1. Introduction 
Transmission control protocol (TCP) can play an important role to deliver the data across the network. But 
TCP will not participate in the cryptography; it will have no way of noticing if malicious data is inserted 
into the packet stream, as the bogus data passes the (non-cryptographic) TCP checksum. TCP will 
acknowledge such data and send it. When the real data arrives, TCP will assume it is duplicate data and 
discard it, since it will have the same sequence numbers as the bogus data. 
To address these, in this paper SSL provides an alternative to the standard TCP/IP socket API that has 
security implemented within it. The philosophy of SSL is that it is easier to deploy something if you don't 
have to change the operating system, so these protocols act “above TCP”.  It requires applications to 
interface to SSL instead of TCP. The primary goal of the SSL protocol is to provide a private channel 
between communicating applications, which ensures privacy of data, authentication of the partners, and 
integrity.  
Open SSL is a derived work from SSLeay. SSLeay was originally written by Eric A. Young and Tim J. 
Hudson beginning in 1995. In December 1998, development of SSLeay ceased, and the first version of 
Open SSL was released as 0.9.1c, using essentially two tools in one: a cryptography library and an SSL 
toolkit Pravir Chandra et al (2002) .The open SSL have the following advantages: 
 Open SSL is a cryptographic library; it provides implementations of the industry's best-regarded algorithms, 
including encryption algorithms such as 3DES ("Triple DES"), AES and RSA, as well as message digest 
algorithms and message authentication codes. 
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 The SSL library provides an implementation of all versions of the SSL protocol, including TLSv1. The 
cryptography library provides the most popular algorithms for symmetric key and public key 
cryptography, hash algorithms, and message digests. It also provides a pseudorandom number generator, 
and support for manipulating common certificate formats and managing key material. There are also 
general-purpose helper libraries for buffer manipulation and manipulation of arbitrary precision numbers. 
Additionally, Open SSL supports most common cryptographic acceleration hardware (prior to Version 
0.9.7, forthcoming as of this writing, hardware support is available only by downloading the separate 
"engine" release). 
 Open SSL is the only free, full-featured SSL implementation currently available for use with the C and C++ 
programming languages. It works across every major platform, including all Unix Oss and all common 
versions of Microsoft Windows. 
The Open SSL makes use the Commands of a configuration file. Although only a few commands currently 
make any use of a configuration file, other commands may be modified in the future to take advantage of 
them. Each command that currently uses the configuration file reads its base configuration information 
from a section that shares the name of the command. Other sections that are not named after a command 
may exist, and quite frequently, they do. Many keys' values are interpreted as the name of a section to use 
for finding more keys. 
The following examples illustrate the usage of Open SSL commands. 
Openssl genrsa -out priv.pem 1024 
This generates 1024-bit RSA private key and writes the result into priv.pem. 
Openssl req -new -config REQ_CONF_FILE -key priv.pem -out request.pem 
This command is used to create, examine and manipulate certificates. It uses the REQ_CONF_FILE as a 
configuration file and specifies to use the private key present in the file priv.pem in the certificate by Pravir 
Chandra et al (2002). 
Openssl ca -in request.pem -out cert.pem –passim pass: CA_PASSWORD Input File 
The ca command is a basic certification authority that can be used to issue X.509 certificates and certificate 
revocation lists William Stallings (1999). Creates a certificate signed by CA and send it to the file 
containing the certificates. It uses the CA_PASSWORD as a password.  
2. PKI background and standards developments 
Public key cryptography was conceived by Diffie and Hellman (1976, 1977) and Rivest, Shamir in and 
Adleman designed the RSA Cryptosystems (1978), the first public key system. Each public key 
cryptosystem has its own technical features, however they all share the property that given an encryption 
key it is computationally infeasible to determine the decryption key and vice versa. Theoretically, no 
confidential information needs to be exchanged before secure communication is possible. Everyone has 
access to the recipient’s public key and even though the communication is private, the message cannot be 
authenticated. This shows that public key cryptography on its own is not enough. If traditional paper based 
commerce are to be reproduced in the electronic environment, the following are required: 
•    Security policies to define the rules under which cryptographic systems should operate 
•    Products to generate store and manage certificates and their associated keys 
•    Procedures to dictate how keys and certificates are generated and distributed 
A trusted and authenticated key distribution infrastructure is necessary to support the use of public keys in a 
public network such as the Internet. Recent efforts in standardization have seen developments on a number 
of fronts. 
2.1 Evolution of PKI standards 
The X.509 Recommendation provides a useful basis for defining data formats and procedures for the 
distribution of public keys via certificates that are digitally signed by CAs. X.509 does not however include 
a profile to specify the supporting requirements for many of the certificate’s sub- fields, extensions or for 
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some data values. 
The standards effort produced an outline for PKI of X.509 Version 3 certificates as well as Version 2 
Certificate Revocation Lists.  The Internet PKI profile went through eleven draft versions before 
becoming RFC 2459 Housley et al (1999). Other profiles have been developed for particular algorithms to 
make use of RFC 2459. 
The development of the PKI management protocols has gone though a number of iterations. RFC 2510 
Adams and Farrell (1999) was developed to specify a message protocol to be used between entities in a PKI. 
The need for an enrolment protocol and the preference to use PKCS#10 message format as the certificate 
request syntax lead to two parallel developments. 
The Certificate Request Syntax was developed in the S/MIME WG which used PKCS#10 Yongge Wang 
(1993) as the certification request message format. Certificate Request Message Format RFC 2511 Myers 
et al (1999) draft was also developed but in the PKIX WG. It was to define a simple enrolment protocol that 
would work for the RFC 2510 Adams and Farrell (1999) enrolment protocols, but it did not use PKCS#10 
as the certificate request message format. Then, RFC 2510 Adams and Farrell (1999) and Myers et al (1999) 
were developed to define an extended set of management messages that flow between the components of 
the Internet PKI. These, combined with CMS Myers et al (1999) allowed the use of an existing protocol 
(S/MIME) as a PKI management protocol, without requiring the development of an entirely new protocol 
such as CMP Adams and Farrell (1999). It also included   PKCS#10   as   the certificate request 
syntax. 
Development of the operational protocols has been more straightforward. Two documents for LDAP have 
been developed — one for defining LDAPv3 as an access protocol to repositories Wahl et al (1997) and 
one for storing PKI information in an LDAP directory Boeyen et al (1999). Using FTP and HTTP to 
retrieve certificates and CRLs from PKI repositories is specified in RFC 2585 Housley and Hoffman 
(1998). 
3. Public Key Infrastructure  
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) provides the means to establish trust by binding public keys and identities, 
thus giving reasonable assurance that we're communicating securely with who we think we are. 
Using public key cryptography, we can be sure that only the encrypted data can be decrypted with the 
corresponding private key. If we combine this with the use of a message digest algorithm to compute a 
signature, we can be sure that the encrypted data has not been tampered with. What's missing is some 
means of ensuring that the party we're communicating with is actually who they say they are. In other 
words, trust has not been established. This is where PKI fits in. 
In the real world, we often have no way of knowing firsthand who a public key belongs to, and that's a big 
problem. Unfortunately, there is no sure-fire way to know that we're communicating with who we think we 
are. The best we can do is extending our trust to a third party to certify that a public key belongs to the 
party that is claiming ownership of it. 
Public Key Infrastructure is very successful in providing a robust and rigorous security measures to protect 
user data and credentials. It ensures trust in electronic transaction Carlisle Adams, Steve Lioyd, and Second 
Edition. Addison Wesley, s November (2002). . This Public Key Infrastructure provides a security services 
such as: 
o Authentication: It is an ability to verify the identity of an entity. 
o Confidentiality: Data is kept secret from those without the proper credentials, even if that data travels 
through an insecure medium. In practice, this means potential attackers might be able to see garbled 
data that is essentially "locked," but they should not be able to unlock that data without the proper 
information. In classic cryptography, the encryption (scrambling) algorithm was the secret. In modern 
cryptography, that isn't feasible. The algorithms are public, and cryptographic keys are used in the 
encryption and decryption processes. 
o Integrity: The basic idea behind data integrity is that there should be a way for the recipient of a piece 
of data to determine whether any modifications are made over a period of time. For example, integrity 
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checks can be used to make sure that data sent over a wire isn't modified in transit. Plenty of 
well-known checksums exist that can detect and even correct simple errors. However, such checksums 
are poor at detecting skilled intentional modifications of the data. Several cryptographic checksums do 
not have these drawbacks if used properly. 
o Non-Repudiation: Cryptography can enable receiver to prove that a message received from sender 
actually came from sender itself. Sender can essentially be held accountable when he sends receiver 
such a message, as he cannot deny (repudiate) that he sent it. In the real world, you have to assume that 
an attacker does not compromise particular cryptographic keys. The SSL protocol does not support 
non-repudiation, but it is easily added by using digital signatures. 
The Components of Public Key Infrastructure are: 
 Cryptographic Module  
 Certifying Authority  
 Registration Authority  
 Certificate Repository 
3.1 Cryptographic Module 
Cryptography Module consists of 2 types : 
 Symmetric Key Cryptography.  
 Public Key Cryptography. 
3.1.1 Symmetric Key Cryptography 
Symmetric key algorithms encrypt and decrypt data using a single key. As shown in Figure 1 the key and 
the plaintext message are passed to the encryption algorithm, producing cipher text. The result can be sent 
across an insecure medium, allowing only a recipient who has the original key to decrypt the message, 
which is done by passing the cipher text and the key to a decryption algorithm. Obviously, the key must 
remain secret for this scheme to be effective. 
The primary disadvantage of symmetric key algorithms is that the key must remain secret at all times. In 
particular, exchanging secret keys can be difficult, since you'll usually want to exchange keys on the same 
medium that you're trying to use encryption to protect. Sending the key in the clear before you use it leaves 
open the possibility of an attacker recording the key before you even begin to send data.  
3.1.2 Public Key Cryptography 
Public key cryptography suggests a solution to the key distribution problem that plagues symmetric 
cryptography. In the most popular form of public key cryptography, each party has two keys, one that must 
remain secret (the private key) and one that can be freely distributed (the public key). The two keys have a 
special mathematical relationship. For Alice to send a message to Bob using public key encryption (see 
Figure 2), Alice must first have Bob's public key. She then encrypts her message using Bob's public key, 
and delivers it. Once encrypted, only someone who has Bob's private key can successfully decrypt the 
message (hopefully, that's only Bob). 
Public key encryption solves the problem of key distribution, assuming there is some way to find Bob's 
public key and ensure that the key really does belong to Bob. In practice, public keys are passed around 
with a bunch of supporting information called a certificate, and those certificates are validated by trusted 
third parties. Often, a trusted third party is an organization that does research (such as credit checks) on 
people who wish to have their certificates validated. SSL uses trusted third parties to help address the key 
distribution problem. 
3.2 Certifying Authority 
3.2.1Certificates 
At the heart of PKI is something called a certificate. In simple terms, a certificate binds a public key with a 
distinguished name. A distinguished name is simply the name of the person or entity that owns the public 
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key to which it's bound. Perhaps a certificate can be best compared to a passport, which binds a picture with 
a name, thus solidifying a person's identity. A passport is issued by a trusted third party (the government) 
and contains information about the person to whom it has been issued (the subject) as well as information 
about the government that issued it (the issuer). Similarly, a certificate is also issued by a trusted third party, 
contains information about the subject, and contains information about the third party that issued it.  
Not unlike a passport, which contains a watermark used to verify its authenticity, a certificate also contains 
safeguards intended to allow the authenticity of the certificate to be verified, and aid in the detection of 
forgery or tampering. Also similar to a passport, a certificate is valid only for a defined period. Once it has 
expired, a new certificate must be issued, and the old one should no longer be trusted.  
A certificate is signed with the issuer's private key, and it contains almost all of the information necessary to 
verify its validity. It contains information about the subject, the issuer, and the period for which it is valid. 
The key component that is missing is the issuer's certificate. The issuer's certificate is the key component 
for verifying the validity of a certificate because it contains the issuer's public key, which is necessary for 
verifying the signature on the subject's certificate. 
By signing a certificate with the issuer's private key, anyone that has the issuer's public key can verify its 
authenticity. The signature serves as a safeguard to prevent tampering. By signing the subject's certificate, 
the issuer asserts that it has verified the authenticity of the public key that the certificate contains and states 
that it may be trusted. As long as the issuer is trusted, the certificates that it issues can also be trusted.  
It's important to note that the issuer's certificate or public key may be contained in an issued certificate. It's 
more important to note that this information cannot be trusted to authenticate the certificate. If it was 
trusted, the element of trust established from a third party is effectively eliminated. Anyone could create 
another key pair to use in signing a certificate and place that public key in the certificate. 
Certificates are also created with a serial number embedded in them. The serial number is unique only to 
the issuer of the certificate. No two certificates issued by the same issuer should ever be assigned the same 
serial number. The certificate's serial number is often used to identify a certificate quickly. 
3.2.2 Certification Authorities 
A Certification Authority (CA) is an organization or company that issues certificates. By its very nature, a 
CA has a huge responsibility to ensure that the certificates it issues are legitimate. That is, the CA must 
ensure beyond all reasonable doubt that every certificate it issues contains a public key that was issued by 
the party that claims to have issued it. It must be able to produce acceptable proof for any certificate that it 
issues on demand. Otherwise, how can the CA itself be trusted? 
There are two basic types of CAs. A private CA has the responsibility of issuing certificates only for 
members of its own organization, and is likewise trusted only by members of its own organization. A public 
CA, such as VeriSign or Thawte, has the responsibility of issuing certificates for any member of the public, 
and must be trusted by the public. The burden of proof varies depending on the type of CA that has issued a 
certificate and the type of certificate that is issued. 
A CA must be trusted, and so for that trust to be extended, its certificate containing its public key must be 
widely distributed. For public CAs, their certificates are generally published so that anyone can obtain them. 
More commonly, the software that makes use of them, such as a web browser, is shipped containing them. 
Most often, the software allows certificates from other CAs to be added to its list of trusted certificates, thus 
facilitating the use of private CAs with off-the shelf software. 
3.2.3 Some Certificate Authority Providers 
Worldwide, the certificate authority business is fragmented, with national or regional providers dominating 
their home market. This is because many uses of digital certificates, such as for legally binding digital 
signatures, are linked to local law, regulations, and accreditation schemes for certificate authorities. 
However, the market for SSL Certificates, a kind of certificate used for website security, is largely held by a 
small number of multinational companies. This market has significant barriers to entry since new providers 
must undergo annual security audits (such as WebTrust for Certification Authorities) to be included in the list 
of web browsers trusted authorities. More than 50 root certificates are trusted in the most popular web 
Computer Engineering and Intelligent Systems    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1719 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2863 (Online) 
Vol 2, No.6, 2011 
38 
 
browser versions. A 2009 market share report from Net Craft as of January of that year determined that 
VeriSign and its acquisitions (which include Thawte and GeoTrust) have a 47.5% share of the certificate 
authority market, followed by GoDaddy (23.4%), and Comodo (15.44%) www.certicom.com, (1999). 
Licensed Certificate Authorities in India: 
 Tata Consultancy Services 
 Safescrypt– A subsidiary of Satyam Infoway 
 National Informatics Center– Govt. of India 
 Institute for Development & Research in Banking Technology (IDRBT)– A    society of 
Reserve Bank of India. 
3.3 Registration authority 
A registration authority (RA) is an authority in a network that verifies user requests for a digital certificate 
and tells the certificate authority to issue it. RAs are part of a public key infrastructure (PKI), a networked 
system that enables companies and users to exchange information and money safely and securely. The 
digital certificate contains a public key that is used to encrypt and decrypt messages and digital Signatures. 
3.4 Certificate repository 
The Certificate Repository consists of the following 2 components.  
3.4.1 Certificate Internal Database 
 This database can only be updated by RA server and CA server. 
 Use to keep track of the pending certificate request, issued or revoked certificate, private 
Certificate Revocation List (CRL), etc. 
 Web user interface via the RA Server will be provided for users to query the status of their 
certificate request and any issued or revoked certificate. 
 Various fields in certificate, such as serial no, expiry date, subject name, etc will be indexed. This 
will allow faster queries based on these standard attributes. 
3.4.2 LDAP Directory Server 
 Can only be updated by CA server. 
 Public repository of Certificate Revocation List (CRL), user and CA certificate. 
 Based on the RFC 2587 schema. 
 Provide standard LDAP Wahl et al (1997) interface to native client for retrieving certificate, e.g. 
S/MIME, SSL client authentication. 
4. Digital Signatures 
A digital signature or digital signature scheme is a mathematical scheme for demonstrating the authenticity 
of a digital message or document. A valid digital signature gives a recipient reason to believe that the 
message was created by a known sender, and that it was not altered in transit. Digital signatures are 
commonly used for software distribution, financial transactions, and in other cases where it is important to 
detect forgery and tampering Rivets and Adelman (1978). 
Digital signatures are often used to implement electronic signatures, a broader term that refers to any 
electronic data that carries the intent of a signature, but not all electronic signatures use digital signatures. 
In some countries, including the United States, and members of the European Union, electronic signatures 
have legal significance. 
Digital signatures employ a type of asymmetric cryptography. For messages sent through an insecure 
channel, a properly implemented digital signature gives the receiver reason to believe the message was sent 
by the claimed sender. Digital signatures are equivalent to traditional hand written in many respects; 
properly implemented digital signatures are more difficult to forge than the handwritten type. Digital 
signature schemes in the sense used here are cryptographically based, and must be implemented properly to 
be effective. Digital signatures can also provide non-repudiation, meaning that the signer cannot 
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successfully claim they did not sign a message, while also claiming their private key remains secret; further, 
some non-repudiation schemes offer a time stamp for the digital signature, so that even if the private key is 
exposed, the signature is valid nonetheless. Digitally signed messages may be anything represent able as a 
bit string: examples include electronic mail, contracts, or a message sent via some other cryptographic 
protocol. 
A digital signature scheme typically consists of three algorithms: 
 An algorithm that selects a private key uniformly at random from a set of possible private keys. 
The algorithm outputs the private key and a corresponding public key. 
 A signing algorithm which, given a message and a private key, produces a signature. 
 A signature verifying algorithm which given a message, public key and a signature, either accepts 
or rejects the message's claim to authenticity. 
Two main properties are required. First, a signature generated from a fixed message and fixed private key 
should verify the authenticity of that message by using the corresponding public key. Secondly, it should be 
computationally infeasible to generate a valid signature for a party who does not possess the private key. 
5. Problem Description 
In this paper, the working principle of the open SSL has been discussed. The sender first generates a key 
pair by using open SSL commands, and then sender will request a certificate to the certificate authority. CA 
generate the certificate along with the necessary information such as a private key, public key, certificate 
and combined all these in a password protected file (P12). Select a file to be signed and signing the chosen 
document and save the signature in a separate file and encrypt the file by using a session key and also 
encrypt the session key with sender’s public key. Sender can send the signature file and encrypted session 
key to the recipient across the network. Recipient receives the document and decrypt with his own private 
key. He finds the session key along with it. He decrypts the signature file and verify signed document and 
signature file .If the decrypted file and original document are same, the receiver assumes the message came 
from authenticate sender only. 
The steps used in implementation of the open SSL are: 
5.1 Setting up of the PKI 
The configuration file, openssl.cnf which is referred for three openssl commands. Namely, ca, request and 
x.509. Make the necessary changes to openssl.cnf present on Linux system .Create two new folders named 
CA and PKI. Run he openssl command to generate the self signed root certificate. When this command is 
run it asks the user to enter a password for the root certificate. The CA’s private key saves in the cakey.pem 
file. Using this private key and the configuration file, we create x.509 v3 CA root certificate named 
cacert.pem. This is a self signed root certificate.        
5.2 Request a certificate  
For requesting a certificate, run the shell script with a user name and password as command line arguments. 
This password is used to protect the p12 file. In this script check is made to ensure both the arguments have 
been entered. If the directory ‘/PKI’ does not contain the certificate of the specified user then, a new one is 
created. This folder shall be used for storing the p12 and the certificate of that particular user. In the file 
/PKI/[user]/req. conf the necessary req and req distinguished information of the user is stored. The user’s 
pfx password is converted to octal format and along with the user’s name, is stored in a file priv. password 
at the location /PKI/[user].Using the openssl command genrsa, a 1024 bit private key is generated and 
subsequently stored in a file priv.pem at the location /PKI/[user].A request for a certificate contains the 
public key corresponding to user’s private key. Using the openssl command req, the public key is extracted 
and later is stored in request.pem at the location /PKI/[user].Next, we use openssl ca command. The CA 
uses it’s password to perform a digital signature on the user’s request. The outcome of this operation is a 
Certificate of the user duly signed by the CA. Also, in our project we used PKCS#12 format as an enhanced 
security measure. The p12 file is password protected file which contains the sensitive data such as private 
key of the user. So we use the openssl pkcs12 command to generate the [username].p12 file. The 
previously, readable pem format certificate is finally encoded into the unreadable DER X509 standard. For 
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convenience, we store the p12 files and certificates separately in folders /PKI/P12-files and 
/PKI/Certificates respectively. 
5.3 Signing a Document 
In this section, we describe the procedure for performing digital signature on a document. A digital 
signature is performed on any document opens the file to be signed, reads it and then return the data 
contained. After taking the p12 file-name and pfx password from the user, a key store of the type 
PKCS12_KEYSTORE_TYPE is created and the p12 file-name and its pfx password is stored in the key 
store. The private key is read from the key store and a call is made to the sign Document. The Digital 
Signature Algorithm (DSA) is used for digitally signing the document 
5.4 Encrypt he signed document and signature file 
In this section, select a digitally signed document for encryption. We can use AES (Advanced Encryption 
Standard) algorithm to encrypt digitally signed document. Generate a random session key by using AES 
algorithm and encrypt the digitally signed document. Now session key also encrypted with the receiver's 
public key. Encrypted signed document is stored Encrypt.txt file at any location of the user's choice. Send 
the encrypted session key and signed document to the receivers id. AES is the best symmetric key 
algorithm for encryption when compare to other algorithms. 
5.5 Decrypt encrypted session key and signed document 
In this session, receiver will receive the encrypted signed file and encrypted session key and select a p12 
file to enter the password. The private key of the user is obtained from the p12 file. By using his own 
private key to decrypt the session key .By using decrypted session key receiver will decrypt the encrypted 
signed document. Decrypted documents is stored any location of the user's choice. Here public key and 
private keys are generated by using RSA Algorithm. RSA is the best asymmetric key algorithm to sharing 
the private key's between the sender and receiver. 
5.6 Verification of the Signature 
In this section, the procedure for verifying the digital signature on a document and sender’s id has been 
explained. In this procedure, first read the signed document, signature file and x.509 certificate of the 
sender to extract his public key. Using the signed document, public key and signature, verify the 
authenticity of the signature. In order to verify the validity of the sender's certificate, the issuer’s certificate 
must be available. So the CA's certificate needs stored in a folder to which the verification process access to. 
For the successful verification of the document, digitally signed document, signature and sender’s id are 
necessary. Both are same signature and certificate to be verified here. 
5.7 Developing the GUI 
In this section, The GUI must provide easy means for letting the user utilize the services available. The 
certificate request page uses the username and password to create the certificate and p12 file for requestor. 
The signing page can be used to browse for a document to be signed. The p12 file and its password is 
selected for signing the document 
The verification file accepts the signed document, the signature file and the sender’s id. The sender’s id is 
mapped onto his certificate. Results are displayed about the validity of the digital signature and the validity 
of the certificate. 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, SSL provide an alternative to the TCP socket API that has security implemented within it. 
SSL provide a private channel between communicating applications, which ensure privacy of data, 
authentication of the partners, and integrity. We have established means for establishing trust between two 
parties who are communicating data and credentials on a network. We accomplish this by setting up a 
private CA. A private CA exists for serving the sole purpose of acting as a trusted third party in a closed 
company network. 
A document is digitally signed before it is sent to receiver. The digital signature detects tampering in transit 
and is non-repudiable. The CA reinforces the trust for the receiver. This is possible because the CA’s 
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signature on the sender’s certificate tells the receiver that the signature was not performed by any random 
user in the network who was capable of generating a key pair. The signing and verification services are 
located centrally at a server. This means that the private key needs transporting to the server for signing. To 
ensure that the private key is not compromised in transit, we use p12 file to securely transport the private 
key. 
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Figure 1.  Symmetric Key Cryptography 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Public Key Cryptography. 
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Figure 3. Structure of Digital Certificate. 
 
 
Figure 4. Diagram showing how a simple digital signature is applied and then verified 
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